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The Use of Discovery Sanctions in
Administrative Agency Adjudication
Present federal administrative adjudication closely resembles the complete
adversary process of the federal judiciary created by the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1938. In the 1960's, administrative
agencies began to adopt more liberal discovery rules for the post-complaint
period of the agency proceeding.' For example, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) adopted a continuous hearing policy in 1961 providing that agency
hearings be held without interruption until their completion.2 Prior to the
adoption of that policy, FTC adjudicative proceedings were held at intervals
in various locations across the country, providing the litigants with sufficient
time to prepare their cases for the next segments based on what had occurred
at previous hearings. 3 Thus, there was no practical need to provide for pre-
trial discovery before the continuous hearing policy was adopted. Also, sup-
port was growing for the proposition that administrative proceedings, like
judicial proceedings, should be as efficient as due process and fairness allow.
To accomplish this, agency proceedings must be conducted with "free access
to relevant evidence, or to information which may lead to the development
of such evidence.'
Since the development of more liberal discovery policies for agency adjudica-
tion, several commentators5 have urged that administrative agencies adopt the
entire discovery provisions of the Federal Rules. Many agencies have incor-
porated much of the Federal Rules for discovery, including discovery sanc-
tions similar to FRCP 37(b)(2), 6 under the authorization of provisions of their
1. The "post-complaint period of the agency proceeding" refers to the time period after
an official complaint is issued and before the administrative adjudication process reaches the
"proceeding" or trial stage.
2. Nicholson, Discovery Is Not a Game, 21 AD. L. REv. 441, 444 (1969).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 443-44. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In that case the
Court held that due process required that recipients of financial aid under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program, like welfare recipients, be given a full evidentiary hearing
before the termination of benefits. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261. More liberal agency discovery
rules soon followed to help facilitate the full evidentiary hearing process and to meet the re-
quirements of due process.
5. See Bennett, Post-Complaint Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: The FTC as a
Case Study, 1975 DuKE L.J. 329 (1975); Tomlinson, Discovery In Agency Adjudication, 1971
DUKE L.J. 89 (1971).
6. The possible sanctions a district court judge may impose upon a recalcitrant civil litigant
include, but are not limited to the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action
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enabling acts. 7 However, the use of discovery sanctions in administrative ad-
judication has received mixed rulings from the federal courts. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that administrative law judges (AL's) cannot constitutionally
use discovery sanctions, while at least three other circuits have allowed AL's
to employ discovery sanctions similar to FRCP 37(b)(2). 8
This Note examines whether ALJ's should have authority to impose
discovery sanctions against civil litigants for refusal to comply with an AL's
discovery order; whether Congress may constitutionally grant administrative
adjudicative bodies this power; and whether Congress actually has enacted
a statutory scheme empowering AL's to utilize discovery sanctions. The
analysis of the issues will show that discovery sanctions are an important ad-
judicative tool for ALJ's to possess, and that their use survives constitutional
and statutory challenge.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Prior to promulgation of the Federal Rules in 1938, pleadings were basical-
ly the only basis for trial preparation in federal courts.9 The new rules allow-
ed much greater preparation for trial through various discovery devices in-
cluding depositions,' ° written interrogatories," production of documents,' 2
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters
in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating
as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit
to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) [order
to submit to a physical or mental examination] requiring him to produce another
for examination; such orders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce
such person for examination. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A-E).
7. See Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 6, 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (1976); National Labor
Relations Act §§ 10, 11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160, 161 (1976); Federal Communications Act of 1934,
§§ 403, 409, 47 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409 (1976). This Note deals with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
and agency adjudication in general. Agencies that may have different statutory enabling acts
as well as different rules and regulations are not dealt with in this Note.
8. The three circuits are the First, Fifth, and the District of Columbia. See infra notes 70-74
and accompanying text.
9. Bennett, supra note 5, at 330.
10. FED. R. Clv. P. 30.
11. Id. R. 33.
12. Id. R. 34.
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and requests for admissions.13 In 1946, FRCP 26 was amended to clarify that
proper pre-trial discovery includes any relevant inquiry "calculated to lead
to admissible evidence,'"" not just inquiries limited to evidence admissible
at trial; and in 1970, FRCP 34 was amended to eliminate the requirements
that a party show good cause why discovery should take place, and that a
party obtain a court order for the production of documents." Discovery in
the federal courts is thus designed to function without court intervention. '
6
If court participation is required, disobedience of discovery orders of a federal
judge by a civil litigant subjects that party to possible sanctions under the
provisions of FRCP 37(b)(2). These sanctions allow the court to "make such
orders in regard to the failure [to obey a discover order] as are just."' "7
In contrast to litigation conducted in the federal courts, the discovery pro-
cedures of administrative agencies often mandate "the direct involvement of
the administrative law judge at each step in the discovery process."" Also,
until the recent enactment of agency rule changes, another major difference
between the federal courts and administrative adjudicative proceedings was
the use of sanctions against civil litigants by federal courts for unjustified
failure to comply with discovery orders. Since 1975, however, several agen-
cies have assumed the power to utilize discovery sanctions patterned after the
FRCP 37(b)(2) sanctions.' 9 Agency regulations do not allow contempt findings
or fines as sanctions, but the ALJ is empowered to "take such action
.. .as is just""0 and is given sanctions to be at his disposal.2 The use of
13. Id. R. 36.
14. Amend. to Rules of Civ. P., 329 U.S. 839, 854 (1946).
15. Amend. to Rules of Civ. P., 398 U.S. 977, 977-78 (1970) (amending Fed. R. Civ. P.
34, 329 U.S. 857 (1946)).
16. Bennett, supra note 5, at 331.
17. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2). See supra note 6.
18. Bennett, supra note 5, at 331.
19. FTC Rule 3.38, 16 C.F.R..§ 3.38 (1982). See also FCC Rule 323, 47 C.F.R. § 1.323
(1981); ICC Rule 67, 49 C.F.R. § 1100.67 (1981).
20. Id.
21. For example, FTC Rule 3.38 provides in part:
(b) If a party or an officer or agent of a party fails to comply with a subpoena
or with an order including, but not limited to, an order for the taking of a deposi-
tion, the production of documents, or the answering of interrogatories, or requests
for admissions; or an order of the Administrative Law Judge or the Commission
issued as, or in accordance with, a ruling upon a motion concerning such an order
or subpoena or upon an appeal from such a ruling, the Administrative Law Judge
or the Commission, or both, for the purpose of permitting resolution of the rele-
vant issues and disposition of the proceeding without unnecessary delay despite
such failure, may take such action in regard thereto as is just, including but not
limited to the following:
(1) Infer that the admission, testimony, documents or other evidence would
have been adverse to the party;
(2) Rule that for the purposes of the proceeding the matter or matters concern-
ing which the order or subpoena was issued be taken as established adversely to
the party;
(3) Rule that the party may not introduce into evidence or otherwise rely, in
support of any claim or defense, upon testimony by such party, officer, or agent,
1983]
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discovery sanctions by an ALJ could be a valuable and indispensable tool
for conducting a fair and efficient proceeding. As one commentator put it,
"[in these times of increasingly protracted and complex administrative ad-
judicatory proceedings, the proper and efficient use of pre-trial discovery to
develop relevant evidence becomes a critical factor in minimizing delay both
in the pre-trial and trial stages of a proceeding." ' 22 Just as the federal judiciary
utilizes FRCP 37(b)(2) to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the discovery
process and the actual trial, it may be desirable for AL's to acquire this
control of administrative proceedings and discovery processes to ensure fairness
and efficiency.
To some extent Congress has created administrative tribunals to supply
governmental supervision over various types of economic enterprise such as
transportation, communication, labor, and commerce.23 This type of ad-
ministrative regulation cannot be accomplished through self-executing legisla-
tion or by judicial bodies because of the detailed expertise necessary to regulate
these complex areas. Agencies, therefore, "should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permit-
ting them to discharge their multitudinous duties."2 "
Through pre-trial conferences, issuance of discovery orders and subpoenas,
and the use of discovery sanctions, federal judges have the ability to move
cases along the adjudicative path. Since an ALJ has the authority to conduct
pre-trial conferences and issue discovery orders and subpoenas, as is conceded
by most critics of the use of discovery sanctions by ALJ's, 21 the AL should
also have immediate authority to force compliance of his discovery orders
and subpoenas to protect the integrity of the hearing process. The First Cir-
cuit recognized this interest in NLRB v. C.H. Sprague & Son Co.. 6 There
the court allowed the ALJ to rule that the company, by refusing to produce
subpoenaed material, forfeited its right to cross-examine witnesses with respect
to any matter that could have been shown by the company's compliance with
the subpoena because any other result would hve jeopardized the "integrity
of the hearing process" itself. 7
or the documents or other evidence;
(4) Rule that the party may not be heard to object to introduction and use
of secondary evidence to show what the withheld admission, testimony, documents,
or other evidence would have shown;
(5) Rule that a pleading, or part of a pleading, or a motion or other submission
by the party, concerning which the order or subpoena was issued, be stricken, or
that a decision of the proceeding be rendered against the party, or both.
22. Bennett, supra note 5, at 329.
23. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1940).
24. Id. at 143.
25. See generally Williams, Authority of Federal Agencies to Impose Discovery Sanctions:
The FTC-A Case In Point, 65 GEo. L.J. 739 (1977). (Williams only challenges the use of discovery
sanctions and not the discovery or pre-trial process).
26. 428 F.2d 938 (lst Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 942-43.
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If ALJ's are given some but not all the essential authority of a federal
judge during the discovery process, administrative decisions will be plagued
by problems of delay, and there will remain a loophole for dilatory trial tac-
tics that could be closed by the use of discovery sanctions.2 8 One commen-
tator recommends that "agencies establish procedures . . whereby control
of proceedings is placed squarely in the agency . with appropriate sanc-
.tions against parties who fail to comply." 2 9 Administrative agencies have ex-
perienced difficulty during the pre-trial stage of an adjudicative process when
one party refuses to cooperate with discovery orders by not exchanging
information. 0 The ALJ needs to have the ability to control the proceeding
to guarantee that all parties exchange discovery and obey all the necessary
discovery orders made during the pre-trial stage.
One commentator opposed to an ALJ's authority to impose discovery sanc-
tions points out that the ALJ already has indirect control of the administrative
adjudicatory proceedings because he can ask a federal district court to issue
an order compelling the discovery. 3' Seeking district court enforcement every
time a party ignores a discovery order, however, is more expensive, cumber-
some, and time-consuming than the administrative procedure. 32 It also under-
cuts the efficiency and fairness of the administrative adjudicatory process,
especially if the agency is faced with a particularly recalcitrant party whose
major litigation strategy is delay. Such delay is inimical to the public interest
and should not be tolerated within the administrative adjudicatory structure. 33
As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in UAW v. NLRB 34 "delay is
especially troubling because it allows the party charged with committing an
unfair labor practice to harass or injure the charging party with relative im-
punity by prolonging adjudication. . . . [The willful violator who acts in
bad faith has the power to postpone any relief for four or five years. ' ' 35 In
UA W v. NLRB, the party refusing to comply with discovery had successfully
delayed the administrative process for seven years. 36
Moreover, an ALJ becomes very familiar with the case, and can better deter-
mine the propriety of an objection to a discovery order than can a federal
judge, who is initially faced with a complex matter when the ALJ seeks en-
28. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. Rv.
258, 312 (1978).
29. Id. at 327.
30. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979); P.S.C. Resources, Inc. v.
NLRB, 576 F.2d 380 (lst Cir. 1978); UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB
v. American Art Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970));
Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 97.
31. See generally Williams, supra note 25, at 755-56. (Williams discusses how Congress has
provided for the FTC to seek district court enforcement of its orders to obtain compliance.)
32. See Uniroyal, 482 F. Supp. at 373. See also UAW, 459 F.2d at 1339.
33. Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 106.
34. 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
35. Id. at 1347.
36. Id. at 1332.
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forcement of the discovery order in district court.3 7 Utilizing a federal district
court every time a discovery order is contested burdens the administrative
process by undermining its intended simplicity, fairness, and efficiency.
A final factor militating in favor of allowing AL's to employ discovery
sanctions is the low standard of review a federal judge uses in determining
whether to grant an agency's request for enforcement of a subpoena. For
example, the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Frederick Cowan and Co., Inc.,3"
held that a district judge ruling on a request for enforcement of an NLRB
subpoena should "undertake only an extremely limited inquiry. No defense
relating to the administrative proceeding can be raised, and the agency need
not even show probable cause to believe that the law has been violated. ' 39
The Seventh Circuit also has established the same standard:
Duly issued subpoenas are to be enforced if the agency is seeking infor-
mation "not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose."
And, the essential requirement [in] both the issuance and enforcement of
... [an agency] subpoena is that the production of the evidence or the
giving of the testimony called for by the subpoena must relate to a "mat-
ter under investigation or question.'''
This enforcement mechanism is merely superficial, routine in nature, and per-
formed by a judge unfamiliar with the administrative proceeding. Thus, to
ensure the integrity of the administrative adjudicatory process, fairness to
private parties, and administrative efficiency, AL's should have the authority
to utilize discovery sanctions patterned after FRCP 37(b)(2).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES
Although there are strong practical reasons for empowering an ALJ with
the authority to use discovery sanctions,"' two constitutional obstacles must
be addressed.,2 The first is a due process argument that private parties are
deprived of their right to a fair and full adjudicatory proceeding if an ALJ
can impose discovery sanctions without the private party having the benefit
of a hearing before a federal district court to air objections to the AL's
discovery order. The other constitutional argument, based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, is that discovery sanctions are judicial in nature and,
consequently, cannot be vested in administrative adjudicative bodies. 3 While
forceful, these constitutional arguments fail to prove that administrative
37. Uniroyal, 482 F. Supp. at 373 n.19.
38. 522 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 28. See also NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, Inc., 306 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1962).
40. NLRB v. Williams, 396 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 1968).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 22-40.
42. See NLRB v. International Medication Systems, 640 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams,
supra note 25; see generally Kintner, Discovery In Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings, 16
AD. L. REv. 233 (1964).
43. Williams, supra note 25, at 744.
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tribunals may not be empowered with discovery sanctions similar to FRCP
37(b)(2).
Due Process
Under the Federal Rules, a party desiring discovery in a federal district
court proceeding merely files his intent. Judicial intervention occurs only if
the party against whom the discovery is sought refuses to respond to the
discovery request. 4 4 If a party does not comply with a discovery request, the
resisting party must show good cause why discovery should not take place. 4-
On the other hand, under most agency rules, application must be made to
the ALJ each time discovery is sought, and the party seeking a subpoena for
discovery has the burden of showing the general relevance and reasonableness
of the scope of the discovery sought. 46 If the party against whom the discovery
is sought then refuses to comply, the requesting party may petition the ALJ
to compel discovery; the burden is on the objecting party to show why
discovery should not take place.47
This type of agency adjudicatory scheme is not identical to the procedure
in federal district courts outlined above; but where it is different, the ad-
ministrative process seems to give greater procedural protection to the party
opposing discovery than does the federal judiciary practice. Not only does
the objecting party have the opportunity to challenge the discovery request
once it has been made, but also, the requesting party must initially go before
the ALJ to show good cause why discovery should take place. This type of
administrative adjudicatory scheme is, at least on its face, completely consis-
tent with the full and fair adjudicatory process of the federal courts.
Since the discovery process of administrative bodies at the very least meets
the procedural safeguards of the discovery process in the federal courts, and
since the ALJ is very familiar with the controversy and the refusing party's
objection, the imposition of discovery sanctions by an ALJ does not offend
44. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26. FRCP 35 is one exception to this process. "When the mental or
physical condition ... of a party. . . is in controversy, the court ... may order the party
to submit to a . . . examination by a physician. [However,] [t]he order may be made only on
a motion for good cause made by the party requesting the examination." FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
45. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(c). The court will look to see if a party or person needs to be pro-
tected from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Id.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1982); See FTC Rules 3.34 to -.37, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.34 to -. 37 (1983).
47. FTC Rule 3.38, 16 C.F.R. § 3.38 (1983); FCC Rule 323, 47 C.F.R. § 1.323 (1981). For
example, FTC Rule 3.38(a) provides in part:
A party who has requested admissions or who has served interrogatories may move
to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections thereto. Unless the objec-
ting party sustains his burden of showing that the objection is justified, the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge shall order that an answer be served. If the Administrative
Law Judge determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of
these rules, he may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended
answer be served.
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due process requirements. A district court judge is not very familiar with the
controversy, and will only be able to make a limited inquiry to ensure that
the order is relevant to the administrative proceeding before compelling
discovery. Not only is the ALJ more cognizant of the overall situation and
considerations involved, but also his authority would be undercut without the
accompanying power to compel the production of documents, the answering
of interrogatories, and other discovery orders."
The final link in the due process chain is that judicial review ultimately
inheres in every agency adjudicative proceeding. Agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings must conform with the due process requirements of the fifth
amendment,"' and whether an agency satisfies the demands of due process
is an appropriate question for judicial review. 5" On such review, the court
may correct any errors of law that occurred during the agency proceeding. 5 I
A party who has had discovery sanctions imposed against it and loses the
administrative proceeding may still appeal to the federal courts. There is no
violation of due process by not having a district court determination of a
party's duty to comply with a discovery order prior to the finish of a pro-
ceeding if two considerations are met. First, before imposing sanctions, the
ALJ must conduct a hearing on the objections to a discovery order in a man-
ner consistent with due process requirements. As previously discussed, this
requirement is satisfied. Second, the party must be able to appeal the final
result of the administrative proceeding to a federal court.
There is some question as to the adequacy of judicial review of discovery
sanctions already imposed by an ALJ22 According to one commentator, "[t]he
trouble with review of [agency] sanctions is that the adverse rulings are likely
to be buried in a massive agency record, resulting in a final order reviewable
under the liberal substantial evidence test. ' ' - 3 Still, this scheme for review of
discovery orders and sanctions is not unlike the type of review an appellate
court would undertake in hearing an appeal of the final decision of a federal
district court. An ALJ should not be denied the ability and discretion to use
discovery sanctions to protect the integrity of the administrative process, which
48. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364, 367-68 (D.D.C. 1979).
49. P.S.C. Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 1978).
50. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1940).
51. Id. at 145.
52. At least one commentator, Williams supra note 25, at 755, believes that it is not enough
that the discovery sanction imposed by an ALJ will be subject to judicial review. "Exercise of
[discovery sanctions] against a party resisting an agency inquiry in good faith deprives it of due
process, of the right to judicial determination of the duty prior to the deprivation of life or
of property for the failure to respond." However, federal court determination of a duty to com-
ply with discovery orders is not a constitutional mandate of due process. The important question
in terms of due pr6cess is whether the process and procedures of administrative adjudication
ensure a full and fair hearing for a party objecting to discovery orders, and give the objecting
party access to judicial review at the close of the proceeding. See supra text accompanying notes
48-52.
53. Williams, supra note 25, at 757. The substantial evidence test allows a reviewing court
to affirm the final outcome of an administrative adjudicatory proceeding if it is substantially
supported by the weight of the evidence.
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otherwise conforms with the requirements of due process,"4 merely because
a reviewing court does not rigorously examine each and every discovery order.
While "it is well settled that Congress may not authorize any enforcement
scheme that denies a right to judicial review,"" this administrative scheme
does not deny a right to review. In fact, it may be even more review than
a party objecting to a discovery order would have received by having a federal
court make a limited inquiry into the propriety of a discovery order before
a final determination. 56 The use of discovery sanctions, then, should survive
a due process challenge. Even if a court finds some defect in the procedural
scheme of some administrative agency,"1 that defect could easily be resolved
by further agency rule promulgation or by statutory action by Congress.58
Separation of Powers
In addition to the due process issue, there exist two other constitutional
problems based on the separation of powers doctrine. The first consideration
involves the Supreme Court's holding in ICC v. Brimson.s9 Brimson raises
questions about the use of any type of discovery sanction in administrative
adjudicatory proceedings. The second problem involves the Supreme Court's
interpretation of article III of the Constitution.
In Brimson, the Court held that Congress could authorize and require cir-
cuit courts to use their process in aid of inquiries before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.6" The Court reasoned that use of the federal judiciary
54. See supra note 49.
55. Williams, supra note 25, at 757. The Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. International Medication
Sys., 640 F.2d at 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1981) used Williams' article as authority when it wrote:
Although courts can only impose Rule 37(b)(2) sanctiong after ruling on all objec-
tions, and then only for disobedience of a judicial order compelling discovery, an
agency imposing such sanctions asserts that for disobedience of its orders directing
discovery, it can impose the sanctions first and let the judicial questions be asked later.
Again, this ignores the fact that agencies such as the FTC, FCC, and NLRB employ pro-
cedural schemes that allow the party opposing discovery orders to present its objections to an
AL. See, e.g., FCC Rule 323, 47 C.F.R. § 1.323 (1981). Thus, these "judicial questions" are
answered first and are also reviewed later by a court.
56. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See generally FTC v. Scientific Living,
Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
57. Obviously there are many administrative agencies which conduct hearings. This Note does
not purport to accomplish a comprehensive review of all agency procedural rules. The emphasis
in this Note is on the FTC, FCC, and NLRB, three agencies that have been in the forefront
of agency adjudication.
58. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping, 335 F.2d 255 (9th
Cir. 1964). In that case the court held that the Federal Maritime Commission did not have the
authority to order the production and copying of documents based on its general rulemaking
statutory enabling act. Id. at 261. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted legislation specifically
providing the Federal Maritime Commission with that power. Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 94.
59. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
60. In Brimson the Court had before it the question of the constitutionality of a portion
of the Interstate Commerce Act which required the circuit courts to help enforce the Commis-
sion's proceedings upon application of the ICC. Id. at 449. The circuit court refused to issue
an order compelling the production of evidence pursuant to the Commission's request. Id. The
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was permissible because an agency "could not, under our system of govern-
ment, and consistent with due process of law, be invested with the authority
to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment."'"
At least one court62 and one commentator63 interpret such reasoning to mean
that "challenges to agency subpoenas must be resolved by the judiciary before
compliance can be compelled" 6 because "[i]mplicit in the Court's holding
is the concept that the power to enforce the agency's subpoena [is] an ex-
clusively judicial function." 65 Arguably, Brimson not only precludes ad-
ministrative fines or imprisonment, it denies the existence of any inherent power
in the federal agencies to enforce their own processes.66 This rationale is based
on the premise that discovery sanctions are an inseparable part of the judicial
power, and that to "vest this power in agency officials, who are a part of
the executive and legislative branches, presents a serious threat to our system
of checks and balances."',
Stretching Brimson beyond its specific holding that barred the sanctions
of imprisonment and fine, however, is much too broad a reading. Brimson
is over eighty-five years old, and to expand its meaning would be to disregard
the changes in administrative structure and procedure that have occurred in
this century. During the past two decades congressionally-sanctioned and
Court-approved growth of administrative adjudication and procedure has taken
place. 68 Administrative courts and their presiding officers conduct civil-type
trials, issue subpoenas, and adjudicate the rights and liabilities of parties. Ad-
ditionally, neither contempt nor an award of expenses is an available agency
sanction,69 and during the past decade several circuits have endorsed the AL's
use of other discovery sanctions such as the use of adverse inferences,70 strik-
ing a recalcitrant party's defense,7 a default-like judgment, 72 precluding the
introduction of secondary evidence by a recalcitrant party, 3 and barring the
rights to cross-examine on matters related to the contested discovery or to
object to the use of secondary evidence by the party who requested discovery."
Supreme Court reversed and held that a civil enforcement proceeding was a matter to which
judicial power extended and a matter to which Congress could authorize the courts to act. Id. at 485.
61. Brimson, 154 U.S. at 485.
62. NLRB v. International Medication Sys., 640 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1981).
63. Williams, supra note 25.
64. International Medication Sys., 640 F.2d at 1115-16.
65. Williams, supra note 25, at 754.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 768. The premise of this line of argument is that the power to impose discovery
sanctions is directly derived from the contempt power of courts and their inherent power to
protect their own authority and process. See Williams, supra note 25, at 744-52 (historical argu-
ment of the judicial nature and origin of all discovery sanctions).
68. See, e.g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
69. See supra note 21.
70. UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
71. Id. Actually the court itself imposed the sanction of striking the recalcitrant party's defense,
but only because the agency itself had failed to take this appropriate action against a party who
had failed to respond to discovery orders for seven years. Id. at 1347.
72. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. NLRB v. American Art Industr., Inc., 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. NLRB v. C.H. Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1970).
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The Court's holding in Brimson and the fact that administrative adjudicative
bodies are not within the judicial branch raise legal obstacles that prevent
AL's from having at their disposal the powerful judicial sanction tools of
contempt and fines. As one commentator suggested, however, the use of in-
ferences and other similar sanctions against a party for failure to obey discovery
orders would be appropriate.15 Sanctions such as striking defenses related to
the requested discovery, drawing adverse inferences, and barring or allowing
the introduction of secondary evidence relate directly to the proceeding and
go to the essence of the needed discovery. These sanctions ensure fairness
in the gathering of evidence, are a natural extension of the administrative
adjudicatory process during discovery, and are consistent with the other
congressionally-authorized and Court-approved judicial-like powers an ALJ
possesses. 7
On the other hand, the federal contempt power is used not only as a discovery
sanction, but also as a device to punish disrespectful parties; it is employed
by judges in all areas of a federal civil proceeding, not just in terms of FRCP
37(b)(2) and discovery. Thus, administrative discovery sanctions are modeled
after FRCP 37(b)(2) to protect the integrity of the adversary hearing process,
but they are not the equivalent of fines and imprisonment reserved to the
federal judiciary by Brimson.7 7
The second separation of powers problem involves article III of the Con-
stitution. This problem must be examined by looking at the Supreme Court's
interpretation of article III through a line of cases culminating with Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co."'
The Constitution provides for national governmental power to be distributed
to the three branches of government and for this power to be checked and
balanced between the branches. One such check is "the requirement that courts
empowered to adjudicate private rights will consist of judges who are pro-
tected in tenure and salary against legislative and executive reactions."" The
75. Kintner, supra note 42, at 237. See generally Charles of the Ritz v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676(2d Cir. 1944).
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
77. While Brimson can be distinguished on the basis that administrative discovery sanctions
are not the same as fine and contempt orders, an argument could be made that Brimson should
be deemed overruled sub silentio. The premise of this argument is that, over the passage of
time since Brimson, administrative agencies have been granted the judicial powers of conducting
discovery and adjudicating the rights of parties, and that several circuits have allowed ALJ's
to utilize other discovery sanctions. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. Thus, since
agencies are already exercising some judicial powers and utilizing some discovery sanctions, Brimson
has no practical value any more. However, this Note does not explore this argument in depth
since Brimson can be distinguished.
78. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. is a plurality opinion written by Justice
Brennan with three other justices joining in the opinion.
79. Address by Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults, Federal Bar Association Meeting
(Sept. 10, 1982). Article III § 1 of the Constitution provides that:
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at Stated Times, receive for their Ser-
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Court in Northern Pipeline emphasized the significance of this feature of the
Constitution by declaring that "a judiciary free from control by the Executive
and Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges
who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.""
Article III serves as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, defines the power
of the judiciary, and protects the independence of the judicial branch."' The
Court in Northern Pipeline stated that the judicial power of the United States
must be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in article III."
These attributes are that the salaries of the judges must be immune from
diminution by Congress, and that the judges must be able to serve for life,
subject only to their continued good behavior.
The Court used its article III analysis and the doctrine of separation of
powers to emphasize that normally the judicial power of the United States
cannot be exercised by a non-article III judge. The Court struck down the
bankruptcy court scheme established by Congress8 3 as unconstitutional precisely
because article III judicial power was being exercised by bankruptcy judges
whose salaries could be lowered by Congress and whose terms would only
be fourteen years. 4 After declaring the bankruptcy scheme unconstitu-
tional, however, the plurality further elaborated on article III and set out
three historically recognized exceptions to article III where non-article III
tribunals may exercise judicial power. 5 Therefore, if administrative ad-
judicatory proceedings come under one of these exceptions, the use of discovery
sanctions by AL's would be consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers even assuming arguendo that the use of discovery sanctions is inherently
a judicial power.
One exception 6 is that the Court has upheld the constitutionality of
vices, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
80. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58 (quoting U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
84. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. had filed for
reorganization in a bankruptcy court and later filed suit against Marathon Pipe Line Co. in
the bankruptcy court seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and duress.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56. Thus, all of Northern's claims were traditional common law
claims. Marathon contended that these claims could not be heard by non-article III judges and
moved for dismissal. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, declaring that the bankruptcy courts had
too broad a grant of power to hear those type of claims and were thus unconstitutional. Id. at 87.
85. The Court held, however, that the bankruptcy courts were not one of these exceptions,
and that "Article III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction
over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 76.
86. The other two exceptions are the Courts Martial, and the non-article III courts of the
United States Territories and the District of Columbia. Id. at 64-66. Also in U.S. v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1978 Federal Magistrates Act.
That act allowed district court judges to refer certain pre-trial motions to a magistrate for initial
determination. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676. In upholding this scheme, the Court noted that the
magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations were subject to de novo review by the district
court. Id. at 681-82.
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legislative courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate
cases involving "public rights."18 7 The Court found the public rights doctrine
to be based upon the principle of separation of powers in conjunction with
an historical understanding that certain areas are reserved to the political bran-
ches of government. 89 In Crowell v. Benson,9 the Court held that "public
rights" means matters arising between the government and persons subject
to its authority such as with economic regulation. 9' Many areas exist concern-
ing public rights and their congressional regulations including such matters
as interstate commerce, federal communications, national labor relations, and
federal trade.9 2 The Court in Northern Pipeline stated:
The understanding ... is that the framers [of the Constitution] expected
that Congress would be free to commit such matters completely to non-judicial executive determination, and that as a result there can be no con-
stitutional objection to Congress' employing the less drastic expedient of
committing their determination to a legislative court or an administrative
agency."
When Congress creates a statutory right, it has the discretion 94 to define
the right, create presumptions, assign burdens of proof, prescribe remedies,
and assign the matter to a congressionally created tribunal to perform the
adjudicative tasks related to the right.9s These tasks, such as deciding the rights
of parties and conducting discovery, are normally performed only by judges.96
The Court also noted that these adjudicative tasks "affect the exercise of
judicial power, but [that] they are also incidental to Congress' power to define
the right that it has created. ' 97 Certainly, the administrative adjudicatory proc-
esses of the FTC, FCC, ICC, and NLRB fall under this exception, and these
agencies are allowed to exercise judicial functions 9 in carrying out their man-
dates. The utilization of discovery sanctions to effectuate Congress' intent
and to protect the integrity of the process follows from the AL's exercise
87. The public rights doctrine was first set forth in Murray's Lessee v. Holboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
88. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67. "Congress' power to create legislative courts to ad-
judicate public rights carries with it the lesser power to create administrative agencies for the
same purpose, and to provide for review of those agency decisions in Article III courts." Id.
at 67 n.18. See generally Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 (1977).
89. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67:
90. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
91. Id. at 50.
92. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 n.22.
93. Id. at 68.
94. Naturally that discretion must be exercised within the bounds of procedural due process.
95. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83.
96. Id. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
97. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83. The Court qualified that by stating that no justifica-
tion exists if the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation such as the common-law
claims and rights being adjudicated in the bankruptcy courts. Id. at 84. The dissent, on the
other hand, suggests that article III and the doctrine of separation of powers is satisfied simply
if there is review by an article III court. Id. at 100 (White, J. dissenting).
98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of other judicial functions, and is consistent with article III of the Constitu-
tion and the exception for administrative adjudicatory bodies created by the
Supreme Court.
"Drawing the line between permissible extensions of legislative power and
impermissible incursions into judicial power is a delicate undertaking, for the
powers of the judicial and legislative branches are often overlapping." 9 9
However, empowering ALJ's with the authority to impose discovery sanc-
tions should survive constitutional challenge on due process grounds and on
separation of powers grounds under article III of the Constitution.
THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AND
A BRIEF CASE HISTORY
Although the Constitution does not prohibit empowering ALJ's with the
authority to use discovery sanctions patterned after FRCP 37(b)(2), the ques-
tion still exists whether Congress has statutorily provided for ALJ's to be
vested with that authority. Congress has not enacted a statute specifically em-
powering ALJ's to use certain types of discovery sanctions, but it has enacted
agency enabling acts' 0 upon which certain agencies, such as the FTC, have
predicated their discovery and procedural rules.'"' Congress, however, has also
statutorily provided that an agency can seek the aid of a federal judicial court
to enforce an agency subpoena.' 2 Therefore, the key issue is the extent to
which that statutory enforcement scheme bars an ALJ from using discovery
sanctions.
At least one court and one commentator have argued that the negative im-
plication of Congress' enactment of this subpoena enforcement plan is that
ALJ's do not have a statutory basis for employing discovery sanctions.' 3 The
Ninth Circuit held that since Congress made elaborate provisions for enforc-
ing NLRB subpoenas, Congress' intent is that the enforcement mechanism
be used.'" 4 "We may not infer that Congress intended to authorize agencies
to bypass district court enforcement proceedings. An efficient and fair en-
forcement mechanism' 5 has been provided and was meant to be used.' 0 6
99. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83 n.35.
100. See supra note 7.
101. See supra note 19.
102. See National Labor Relations Act, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1976); Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976); Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 409(g), 47
U.S.C. § 409(g) (1976).
103. See Williams, supra note 25, at 756-59; NLRB v. International Medication Sys., 640 F.2d
1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1981).
104. International Medication, 640 F.2d at 1116.
105. Whether or not it actually is an efficient and fair mechanism is open to some debate.
See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. In fact, even the Ninth Circuit noted that once
an enforcement matter finally gets to the district court, the district court judge may only make
a limited inquiry to decide whether to enforce the subpoena. International Medication, 640 F.2d
at 1114 n.2.
106. International Medication, 640 F.2d at 1116.
[Vol. 59:113
DISCO VERY SANCTIONS
The appellate court concluded that Congress granted to the district courts
the exclusive authority to compel compliance with the agency subpoenas. 7
It seems that these critics relied upon FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping,108
as a basis for this reasoning.' 9 In Anglo-Canadian Shipping, the Federal
Maritime Commission brought an action in federal court for enforcement of
a Commission order concerning discovery."' The issue raised by the respon-
dent was whether the Commission had the authority to promulgate rules for
discovery and production of documents.' The Ninth Circuit held that "the
regulations of an agency of the United States must be issued within the powers
conferred by Congress."'1 2 The court also held that general rule-making
statutes, such as statutory enabling acts, do not grant to the agency a suffi-
cient basis upon which to predicate discovery rules." 3 The court concluded:
[I]t seems fair to say that there inheres in discovery procedure involving
the prehearing production and copying of documents, a potential impact
upon litigants so much greater than that associated with ordinary pro-
cedural rules, that the failure of Congress to affirmatively authorize the
same should be taken as a deliberate choice. "
4
The effect of Anglo-Canadian Shipping, however, has been severely undercut'
by FCC v. Schreiber' ' 6 and subsequent cases' that have allowed ALJ's to
use discovery sanctions patterned after FRCP 37(b)(2). The conclusion that
Congress precluded the utilization of discovery sanctions by authorizing an
agency to seek enforcement of discovery in a district court is also undermined.
In Schreiber, the Supreme Court held that a statute"' authorizing the FCC
to "conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper
dispatch of business and to the ends of justice"' 9 was proper and gave the
FCC discretion to conduct its proceedings as it saw fit. '2 The court reasoned
that the statute "explicitly and by implication" allowed the FCC to resolve
questions of agency procedure:'22
107. Id.
108. 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
109. Williams, supra note 25, relied on Anglo-Canadian Shipping as did the Ninth Circuit
which also quoted Williams as authority.
110. FMC, 335 F.2d at 256.
111. Id. FMC Rule of Practice 12(k), 46 C.F.R. § 201.211 (Supp. 1963) authorized hearing
examiners (administrative law judges) to order the production of documents in a party's posses-
sion for copying. Id. at 257.
112. FMC, 335 F.2d at 258.
113. Id. at 259. Section 204(b) of the Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1114(b) (1958) pro-
vided that "[t]he Federal Maritime Board and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to
adopt all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the powers, duties, and functions vested
in it or him by this Chapter."
114. FMC, 335 F.2d at 260.
115. Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 94.
116. 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
117. See supra notes 70-74.
118. Communications Act of 1934, as amended 48 Stat. 1068, 47 U.S.C. § 1540) (1958 ed.).
119. Id.
120. FCC, 381 U.S. at 289.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The statute does not merely confer power to promulgate rules ... it also
delegates broad discretion to prescribe rules for specific investigations. Con-
gress has "left largely to [the agency's] judgment the determination of
the manner of conducting its business which would most fairly and
reasonably accommodate" the proper dispatch of its business and the end
of justice. 123
Cases subsequent to Schrieber suggest that the use of discovery sanctions
can be justified on the basis of a general rule-making statute despite the fact
Congress has enacted statutes allowing agencies to go to federal court for
enforcement of subpoenas. The courts in these cases'"" have not found that
the statutory scheme enacted by Congress precludes an ALJ's use of discovery
sanctions. Rather, the courts have looked to the important policy considera-
tions involved'25 and have approved the use of discovery sanctions by AL's.
The first two cases involve the Department of Labor and Uniroyal, Inc.1 26
Uniroyal brought both cases, challenging the pre-trial discovery regulations
issued by the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to an executive order,' 27 as an im-
permissible exercise of power.
The first case resulted from an administrative proceeding concerning allega-
tions against Uniroyal of discriminatory employment practices against women
and minorities.'2 8 Uniroyal had not been cooperative with several government
discovery requests, and had refused to supply certain information, contend-
ing that such information was either "irrelevant, confidential, beyond the scope
of the proceeding or physically unavailable."' 29 Upon Uniroyal's refusal to
comply, the government petitioned the ALJ to issue an order compelling
discovery. After the ALJ issued the order, Uniroyal again refused to comply. 3
Finally, the ALJ ruled that if Uniroyal did not comply before the hearing,
he would impose a discovery sanction such that the "requests to admit and
interrogatories . . .would be deemed admitted.""'' The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the executive order gave the Secretary of Labor broad rule-
making authority to engage in investigations and to hold enforcement hear-
ings. Consequently, it was proper for the Secretary "to adopt discovery rules
in the gap between an investigation and a hearing. ''' 2 The court, although
only specifically holding that Uniroyal's action was premature because it had
123. Id.
124. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 22-41.
126. The first case is an appellate court decision, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060
(7th Cir. 1978). The second case is a district court case in the D.C. Circuit, Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979).
127. See Exec. Order No. 11246, §§ 202(4-6), 208(a), 209(a)(5-6), 212, 29 C.F.R. 126 (1981),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (1981). See also 41 C.F.R. 60-30.1 to -.17 (1981).
128. Uniroyal, 579 F.2d at 1062.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1063.
132. Id. at 1067. The court also pointed out that "the courts are divided on the scope of
[the] powers conferred by general rulemaking authority." Id.
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not exhausted administrative review, did suggest that there was nothing novel
or objectionable about the use of pre-hearing discovery regulations.' 33
The issues in the second Uniroyal'34 case were similar to those in the first:
whether a party may be required to submit to discovery; and whether an ALJ
can impose sanctions for non-compliance.' 3 The district court did not ques-
tion the AL's authority to permit discovery 36 and held that "[o]bviously
that hearing authority would be largely meaningless without the concomitant
power to compel the production of evidence both from the government and
from [Uniroyal] who is a party to the hearing."' 37 Recognizing the need to
protect the integrity of the administrative process, the court assumed that in
issuing the executive order, the President intended to empower the Secretary
of Labor and his designees (administrative law judges) "with the necessary
ancillary authority to compel discovery." '
3
The reasoning of the Uniroyal court supports the proposition that AL's
in other agency adjudicatory proceedings need and should have the authority
to compel discovery without an explicit grant of power. This authority is based
upon the same general statutory enabling acts upon which agency adjudicative
bodies have relied to implement other discovery regulations. The authority
for an ALJ to issue discovery orders and impose sanctions, derived from the
executive order by the court in Uniroyal, is analogous to the Supreme Court's
holding in Schreiber that a general agency rulemaking statute implicitly gave
the administrative agency broad rulemaking authority to resolve questions of
agency procedure.' 3 9 In both areas the same interests are determinative:
fairness, efficiency, and the ensurance of the integrity of the administrative
process. Additionally, cases dealing with the NLRB have found these policy
considerations compelling, and have allowed AL's to compel discovery by
utilizing discovery sanctions without having to resort to federal courts for
enforcement of these orders.
In NLRB v. American Art Industries, Inc.'40 the NLRB petitioned the Fifth
Circuit to enforce the Board's order directing American Art Industries to cease
and desist from unfair labor practices, to bargain collectively with the union,
133. Id. The court in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973) would agree. The court there stated, "[O]verwhelming judicial support [has been] given
to expansive agency readings of statutory rule-making authorizations that are not flatly inconsis-
tent with other statutory provisions .... " Id. at 691. The court added that express legislative
authorization has only been required for "novel assertions of agency powers." Id. There is,
however, nothing novel or revolutionary about using discovery sanctions in conjunction with
discovery rules to protect the integrity of the pre-trial discovery process.
134. 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979).
135. Id. at 367. Unlike the first Uniroyal case where the appellate court held that the action
was premature, here the district court upheld the authority of the ALJ to compel discovery.
Id. at 368.
136. Id. at 367-68.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 368.
139. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
140. 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969).
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and to offer to reinstate unlawfully fired employees.' 4' American Art challenged
the order on the basis that during the hearing, the ALJ erred by not allowing
the company to introduce secondary evidence to prove the total number of
employees on the company's payroll. 2 The company had refused to produce
employee earning's records, as required by subpoena, which would have con-
clusively determined the proper size of the bargaining unit.4 3 During the hear-
ing, the company attempted to introduce secondary evidence"" to prove the
size of the bargaining unit and to rebut the secondary evidence introduced
by the Government.'' Even though the ALJ had not sought enforcement by
the district court under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2),'" the Fifth Circuit approved the
AL's action barring the introduction of the company's secondary evidence
on the basis that "it would have been inequitable to allow the company to
contradict [the Government's secondary evidence] with more secondary
evidence while the company ... had in its possession the subpoenaed earning
records which would have been conclusive."'"' The appellate court held that
the ALJ acted properly in imposing this sanction because of the need to main-
tain the fairness and integrity of the hearing process.'"
The First Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in NLRB v. C.H.
Sprague & Son Co. "' which dealt with charges against a company for unlawful
labor practices in regard to an employees' vote on whether to unionize.15 1
During the administrative proceeding a subpoena was issued ordering the pro-
duction of some of the company's documents and records."' The company
objected to this administrative order and refused to produce the requested
material.' 52 Without seeking enforcement in district court, the ALJ ruled that
the company, by refusing to comply with the discovery order, had "forfeited
its right to cross-examine witnesses with reference to any matter which could
have been produced by complying with the subpoena."' 5 3 Although the com-
pany argued that 29 U.S.C § 161(2) was the exclusive mechanism for the en-
forcement of agency subpoenas, the appellate court held that the imposition
of the sanction by the ALJ was proper." 4 The court recognized that since
the ALJ was faced with such a recalcitrant party, he was justified in making
his ruling "in the interest of maintaining the integrity of the hearing process.""'
141. Id. at 1225.
142. Id. at 1229.
143. Id.
144. The company attempted to introduce what it alleged to be the time cards punched by
its employees during a week of work. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
147. 415 F.2d at 1230.
148. Id.
149. 428 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1970).
150. Id. at 939.
151. Id. at 942.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court did recognize that Congress probably intended for the enforcement mechanism
to be used, but did not find that it had to be used, especially when dealing with a particularly
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In another unfair labor practices case involving an organizational campaign
for unionization, UA W v. NLRB, 6 the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the decisions of the Board since the ALJ failed to impose discovery sanctions
based on a company's seven year failure to produce relevant documents within
its control pursuant to a discovery order.15 7 The court held that imposing an
adverse inference against a party ignoring a subpoena is a proper sanction
to protect the integrity of the administrative process, and that in some cir-
cumstances refusal to comply with a subpoena would even justify "striking
a defense, or completely barring introduction of evidence on the point in
question."3 8
The major factor that influenced the appellate court's judgment on the use
of these types of sanctions was that enforcement is such an awkward, time-
consuming, and costly process."' The court noted that these sanctions permit
"vindication of the tribunal's authority" without having to go through the
delay of district court enforcement which is "of necessity collateral to the
main case.""' The court also suggested that the judicial courts have actually
discouraged this path of collateral enforcement because it already adds to
the delays inherent in agency procedures.' 6' In overturning the NLRB the court
concluded, "rather than allowing the Board to choose . . whether or not
to [utilize sanctions] ... we have decided to specify precisely the disposition
which the Board must now make of this case. We are therefore ordering the
Board to strike Gyrodyne's... defense unless ... [Gyrodyne complies with
discovery]."62
This series of NLRB cases highlights the types of sanctions that several
judicial circuits' 63 have allowed AL's to impose on parties refusing to comply
with discovery orders. These courts have not found that the availability of
seeking enforcement in federal court is the exclusive means intended by Con-
gress for the enforcement of discovery orders.' In fact, these opinions strongly
suggest that an AL's use of discovery sanctions is necessary in terms of
fairness, efficiency, and protection of the integrity of the administrative ad-
recalcitrant party. Id. The court also suggested that it might have viewed the situation differently
had the party made a good faith objection. Id. However, that was just dictum.
156. 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The parties in the administrative proceeding were the
UAW and Gyrodyne Company. The ALJ ruled in favor of the defendant, Gyrodyne Company,
and thus the UAW brought this action against the NLRB seeking a reversal of the AL's ruling.
157. Id. at 1332.
158. Id. at 1338.
159. Id. at 1339.
160. Id. Gyrodyne suggested that the adverse inference rule can only be used by a party after
that party has made a prima facie case. Id. at 1344. See also Williams, supra note 25, at 759-67.
However, the court rejected and pointed out that "although counsel confidently states this rule
as if it were part of the organic law of the land, there is in fact substantial authority to the
contrary." UAW, 459 F.2d at 1344.
161. UAW, 459 F.2d at 1344.
162. Id. at 1347. While the court acknowledged that Gyrodyne could prove its case by secon-
dary evidence if it chose to do so, this was because the court chose not to deny the use of secon-
dary evidence as a discovery sanction.
163. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 138, 147, 154 & 161.
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judicatory process.1 65 Schreiber and the NLRB cases indicate that an AL's
use of discovery sanctions may be founded on general rule-making statutes,
and do not have to be explicitly provided for by Congress. Moreover, this
conclusion is supported by the need for the ALJ to be firmly in control of
discovery to ensure the fairness and integrity of the process.' 66
CONCLUSION
As federal court dockets become more crowded and federal regulation
becomes more complex, administrative agency adjudication will play an in-
creasingly important role in the federal litigation scheme. Consequently, it
is essential that AL's be given the necessary power to move cases smoothly
along the adjudicative path and to protect the integrity of the administrative
process. The judicial-type powers which AL's have in conducting discovery
during the pre-trial stage of an administrative proceeding should extend to
the use of discovery sanctions. Compelling policy reasons, such as avoidance
of purposeful delay by recalcitrant parties, fairness to parties seeking discovery,
and efficiency in the administrative process, support this extension of the AL's
authority.
No constitutional or statutory obstacles preclude an AL's use of discovery
sanctions. The administrative adjudicatory process guarantees that the demands
of due process, article III, and the separation of powers doctrine are met.
Careful analysis of Supreme Court adjudication in these constitutional areas
reveals that the use of discovery sanctions in administrative proceedings is
permissible. In addition, even though Congress has enacted a federal court
scheme which AL's may use to seek enforcement of discovery orders, policy
considerations and recent cases indicate that this congressionsl scheme should
not be the exclusive method for enforcing administrative discovery orders.
Authority granted by general rule-making statutes and the need to ensure a
fair hearing permit AL's to use an array of discovery sanctions.
RicHARD T. FRuE
165. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 148, 155 & 159.
166. Since the use of discovery sanctions is important to maintain control of evidence ex-
change during discovery and to ensure a fair adjudicatory process, discovery sanctions should
be derived from general rule-making statutes. Discovery sanctions may be justified as being
statutorily permissible since (1) they are not explicitly prohibited by Congress, (2) courts have
allowed their use without forcing the agency to seek district court enforcement, and (3) their
use is mandated by the policy considerations of fairness, efficiency, and protecting the integrity
of the process.
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